There are, but they fall under the heading of "things that are bad about AV anyway".
For example, consider the French presidential election of 2002, in which Chirac faced le Pen in the final round. He took 82% of the vote, which I think we can safely say he wouldn't have achieved in an instant runoff. The Socialists endorsed Chirac in the second round, but I suspect that it's politically very difficult for the party that "should" be in second place to say, "look, we really think we can win this election, but just in case we come third you should vote for our main opponents second. Really. We're very confident".
Pretty much any electoral system would have delivered Chirac as the winner of that election. And it's not as if those people who voted "against le Pen" rather than "for Chirac" actually changed their opinions or their preferences between the rounds, but the exact count was surely affected, since knowing the result of the first round motivated them to *express* that preference. A rational electorate and campaign, capable of coldly considering hypotheticals, would have fewer reasons for runoffs to differ from AV, but still not none.
For example both runoffs and AV still have some perversities, it's not just FPTP. In that same election, suppose that le Pen's support was slightly weaker. Chirac, while looking good to win the election, might have thought to himself that he'd much rather face le Pen in the final than Jospin. In which case, he could ask a small proportion of his own supporters to vote for le Pen in the first round, just to be sure of eliminating Jospin. AV is also weak to this tactic, although not as weak as a real runoff, since in a real runoff Chirac's fifth columnists can switch back to him in the final round, whereas in AV they can't.
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timeasmymeasure
no subject
Date: 2011-04-18 10:39 pm (UTC)For example, consider the French presidential election of 2002, in which Chirac faced le Pen in the final round. He took 82% of the vote, which I think we can safely say he wouldn't have achieved in an instant runoff. The Socialists endorsed Chirac in the second round, but I suspect that it's politically very difficult for the party that "should" be in second place to say, "look, we really think we can win this election, but just in case we come third you should vote for our main opponents second. Really. We're very confident".
Pretty much any electoral system would have delivered Chirac as the winner of that election. And it's not as if those people who voted "against le Pen" rather than "for Chirac" actually changed their opinions or their preferences between the rounds, but the exact count was surely affected, since knowing the result of the first round motivated them to *express* that preference. A rational electorate and campaign, capable of coldly considering hypotheticals, would have fewer reasons for runoffs to differ from AV, but still not none.
For example both runoffs and AV still have some perversities, it's not just FPTP. In that same election, suppose that le Pen's support was slightly weaker. Chirac, while looking good to win the election, might have thought to himself that he'd much rather face le Pen in the final than Jospin. In which case, he could ask a small proportion of his own supporters to vote for le Pen in the first round, just to be sure of eliminating Jospin. AV is also weak to this tactic, although not as weak as a real runoff, since in a real runoff Chirac's fifth columnists can switch back to him in the final round, whereas in AV they can't.